Does CEO turnover matter in China? Evidence from the stock market

被引:19
作者
Pessarossi, Pierre [1 ]
Weill, Laurent [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France
[2] Univ Strasbourg, EM Strasbourg Business Sch, Inst Etud Polit, 47 Ave Foret Noire, F-67082 Strasbourg, France
关键词
CEO turnover; Corporate governance; State ownership; China; Event studya;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeconbus.2013.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study the consequences of CEO turnover announcements on the stock prices of firms in China, where most listed firms remain majority-owned by the state. Our proposition is that state ownership may affect stock market reaction to CEO replacement because state-owned firms often pursue multiple, potentially contradictory, objectives, i.e. economic performance and social objectives. Applying standard event study methodology to a sample of 1155 announcements from 2002 to 2010, we find that CEO turnover typically produces a positive stock market reaction. The reaction is significantly positive, however, only for enterprises owned by the central government, and not significant for enterprises owned by local governments or privately owned enterprises. These results suggest that a CEO turnover in a central state-owned enterprise signals a renewed commitment to the economic performance objective by state officials. The small size of CEO labor market suggests that other shareholders have a relatively small pool of CEO talent to proceed to managerial improvement when a CEO turnover takes place. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 42
页数:16
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