THE BASIC ANALYTICS OF MORAL HAZARD

[1] ARNOTT RJ, 1986, 635 QUEENS U I EC RE

[2] ARNOTT RJ, 1987, EQUILIBRIUM COMPETIT

[3] ARNOTT RJ, 1988, IN PRESS RAND J EC

[4] HELLWIG M, 1983, 109 U BONN DISC PAP

[5] MORAL HAZARD IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (01) : 8 - 23

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1974, 88 (01) : 44 - 62

[8] STIGLITZ JE, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P393

[9] INCENTIVES AND RISK SHARING IN SHARECOPPING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1974, 41 (02) : 219 - 255

[10] Stiglitz Joseph E., 1983, GENEVA PAP RISK INS, V8, P4, DOI DOI 10.1057/GPP.1983.2

[1] ARNOTT RJ, 1986, 635 QUEENS U I EC RE

[2] ARNOTT RJ, 1987, EQUILIBRIUM COMPETIT

[3] ARNOTT RJ, 1988, IN PRESS RAND J EC

[4] HELLWIG M, 1983, 109 U BONN DISC PAP

[5] MORAL HAZARD IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (01) : 8 - 23

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[7] OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1974, 88 (01) : 44 - 62

[8] STIGLITZ JE, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P393

[9] INCENTIVES AND RISK SHARING IN SHARECOPPING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1974, 41 (02) : 219 - 255

[10] Stiglitz Joseph E., 1983, GENEVA PAP RISK INS, V8, P4, DOI DOI 10.1057/GPP.1983.2