COALITION-FORMATION IN STANDARD-SETTING ALLIANCES

被引：183

作者：

AXELROD, R

MITCHELL, W

THOMAS, RE

BENNETT, DS

BRUDERER, E

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN, SCH BUSINESS ADM, ANN ARBOR, MI 48109 USA

[2] UNIV FLORIDA, COLL BUSINESS ADM, GAINESVILLE, FL 32611 USA

[3] SUNY BUFFALO, DEPT POLIT SCI, BUFFALO, NY 14260 USA

[4] UNIV MINNESOTA, CARLSON SCH MANAGEMENT, MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55455 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1995年 / 41卷 / 09期

关键词：

STANDARDIZATION; ALLIANCE; COMPUTER INDUSTRY; UNIX;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.41.9.1493

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards. Our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard-setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance, especially close rivals. The predicted alliance configurations are simply the Nash equilibria, i.e., those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance. We illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing Unix operating system standards in 1988.

引用

页码：1493 / 1508

页数：16

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