Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion

被引:7
作者
Chaigneau, Pierre [1 ]
机构
[1] HEC Montreal, Dept Finance, 3000 Chemin Cote Sainte Catherine, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
关键词
CEO pay; Principal-agent model; Corporate governance; Decreasing relative risk aversion; Stock-options;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeconbus.2012.10.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
It is established that the standard principal-agent model cannot explain the structure of commonly used CEO compensation contracts if preferences with constant relative risk aversion are postulated. However, we demonstrate that this model has potentially a high explanatory power with preferences with decreasing relative risk aversion, in the sense that a typical CEO contract is approximately optimal for plausible preference parameters. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:4 / 23
页数:20
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