SOME EXTENSIONS OF A CLAIM OF AUMANN IN AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE

[1] AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J]. ANNALS OF STATISTICS, 1976, 4 (06) : 1236 - 1239

[2] NORMAL BAYESIAN DIALOGS [J]. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1979, 74 (368) : 837 - 846

[3] BACHARACH MOL, 1984, PROPERTIES 2 PERSON

[4] BACHARACH MOL, 1984, INFORMATION PARTITIO

[5] Cresswell M., 1968, INTRO MODAL LOGIC

[6] EBERLE R, 1974, SYNTHESE, V26

[7] Eells E, 1982, RATIONAL DECISION CA

[8] Geanakoplos J., 1982, J ECON THEORY, V26, P363

[9] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[10] EQUILIBRIUM CONTRACTS FOR SYNDICATES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) : 1635 - 1665

[1] AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J]. ANNALS OF STATISTICS, 1976, 4 (06) : 1236 - 1239

[2] NORMAL BAYESIAN DIALOGS [J]. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1979, 74 (368) : 837 - 846

[3] BACHARACH MOL, 1984, PROPERTIES 2 PERSON

[4] BACHARACH MOL, 1984, INFORMATION PARTITIO

[5] Cresswell M., 1968, INTRO MODAL LOGIC

[6] EBERLE R, 1974, SYNTHESE, V26

[7] Eells E, 1982, RATIONAL DECISION CA

[8] Geanakoplos J., 1982, J ECON THEORY, V26, P363

[9] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[10] EQUILIBRIUM CONTRACTS FOR SYNDICATES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) : 1635 - 1665