ON THE INCONSISTENCY OF CERTAIN AXIOMS ON SOLUTION CONCEPTS FOR NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES

[1] ABREU D, 1982, INCONSISTENCY CERTAI

[2] [Anonymous], 1978, INT J GAME THEORY

[3] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[4] FARQUHARSON R, 1957, THEORY VOTING

[5] A THEORY OF N-PERSON GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1953, 39 (06) : 496 - 501

[6] Harsanyi JC, 1976, INT J GAME THEORY, V5, P211, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01761604

[7] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 863 - 894

[8] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[9] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400

[10] Selten R., 1973, INT J GAME THEORY, V2, P141

[1] ABREU D, 1982, INCONSISTENCY CERTAI

[2] [Anonymous], 1978, INT J GAME THEORY

[3] [Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[4] FARQUHARSON R, 1957, THEORY VOTING

[5] A THEORY OF N-PERSON GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1953, 39 (06) : 496 - 501

[6] Harsanyi JC, 1976, INT J GAME THEORY, V5, P211, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01761604

[7] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 863 - 894

[8] DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1979, 47 (06) : 1337 - 1351

[9] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400

[10] Selten R., 1973, INT J GAME THEORY, V2, P141