Technology strategy, governance structure and interdivisional coordination

被引：69

作者：

Argyres, NS

机构：

[1] School of Business Administration, University of Southern California, Los Angeles

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1995年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

governance structure; coordination; technology strategy; multidivisional form;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(95)00039-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies how various organizational forms compare in their capacities to solve coordination problems created by technological interdependence between firms' divisions. I contrast the organizational mechanisms used by two firms, IBM and General Motors, to address these problems. While it is widely recognized that centralization distorts incentives facing division managers, this paper highlights its benefits when there are large potential gains from agreement on technological standards. The examples show how a centralized governance structure supported by lower-powered incentives facilitates interdivisional coordination. This suggests a refinement of the theory of organizational form based on how firms resolve the tensions between strategic planning and the measurement of organizational units' performances.

引用

页码：337 / 358

页数：22

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