Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There Is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting

被引：67

作者：

Acharya, Viral V. ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Mehran, Hamid ^{[4
]}

Thakor, Anjan V. ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

[2] CEPR, Washington, DC USA

[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[4] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA

[5] ECGI, New York, NY USA

[6] Washington Univ, St Louis, MO USA

来源：

REVIEW OF CORPORATE FINANCE STUDIES | 2016年 / 5卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rcfs/cfv006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk shifting. However, faced with socially costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which banks use excessive leverage to fund correlated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards-insufficient loan monitoring and asset substitution-requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a "special capital account" that is unavailable to creditors upon failure.

引用

页码：36 / 75

页数：40

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