THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE

被引：20

作者：

Calvo, Emilio ^{[1
]}

Gutierrez, Esther ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal & ERI CES, Av dels Tarongers,S-N, Valencia 46022, Spain

[2] Univ Basque Country, Dept Econ Aplicada 4, Bilbao 48015, Spain

来源：

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW | 2013年 / 15卷 / 01期

关键词：

Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value;

D O I：

10.1142/S0219198913500023

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.

引用

页数：24

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