RULES VERSUS DISCRETION IN MONETARY-POLICY - THE CASE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引:3
作者
ANDERSEN, TM
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10.1016/0165-1889(86)90035-7
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F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:169 / 174
页数:6
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