Canada, grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific: Past lessons, future directions

Canada pursued a consistent and relatively successful grand strategy towards the United States for much of the postwar period. It was designed to ensure greater adaptability to strategic shifts in American security policy and any bilateral disagreements that consequently emerged. Without the capacity to shape the international system, Canadian grand strategy was largely confined to managing strategic relations with its superpower patron in North America and the NATO alliance. Yet this article argues that Canada has a much more modest capacity when it comes to independently shaping and engaging in the Asia-Pacific as a relevant political and economic player. As it will reveal, Canada had twice before applied strategic principles towards the Asia-Pacific - first as a direct participant in the Korean War and later with a more arms-length approach to the Indochina conflict. These episodes provide important clues on the trends, patterns, and limits to any purported Canadian grand strategy for the Asia-Pacific, which must adapt to a shifting world order defined by Asian dynamism and European (and possibly American) decline. The article will conclude with some thoughts on how Canada's strategic choices might evolve towards the region.