THE COSTS OF SUBSTITUTION

[1] AKERLOF GA, 1970, Q J EC, V90, P475

[2] Bain JS, 1956, BARRIERS NEW COMPETI, DOI 10.4159/harvard.9780674188037

[3] FARRELL J, 1980, PRICES SIGNALS QUALI

[4] KLEIN, 1981, J POL EC, V89, P615

[5] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[6] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[7] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[8] COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR IN NONCOOPERATIVE EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLIES WITH LONG BUT FINITE LIVES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1980, 22 (02) : 136 - 154

[9] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[10] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400

[1] AKERLOF GA, 1970, Q J EC, V90, P475

[2] Bain JS, 1956, BARRIERS NEW COMPETI, DOI 10.4159/harvard.9780674188037

[3] FARRELL J, 1980, PRICES SIGNALS QUALI

[4] KLEIN, 1981, J POL EC, V89, P615

[5] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[6] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[7] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[8] COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR IN NONCOOPERATIVE EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLIES WITH LONG BUT FINITE LIVES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1980, 22 (02) : 136 - 154

[9] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[10] Selten R., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P25, DOI 10.1007/BF01766400