The influence of social networks and homophily on correct voting

被引:4
作者
Watts, Alison [1 ]
机构
[1] Southern Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA
关键词
social networks; correct voting; homophily;
D O I
10.1017/nws.2014.1
中图分类号
O1 [数学]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
There is empirical evidence suggesting that a person's family, friends, or social ties influence who a person votes for. Sokhey & McClurg (2012) find that as political disagreement in a person's social network increases, then a person is less likely to vote correctly. We develop a model where voters have different favorite policies and wish to vote correctly for the candidate whose favorite policy is closest to their own. Voters have beliefs about each candidate's favorite policy which may or may not be correct. Voters update their beliefs about political candidates based on who their conservative and liberal social ties are supporting. We find that if everyone's social network consists only of those most like themselves, then the conditions needed for correct voting to be stable are fairly weak; thus political agreement in one's social network facilitates correct voting. We also give conditions under which correct voting is stable for networks exhibiting homophily and for networks exhibiting random social interactions.
引用
收藏
页码:90 / 106
页数:17
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