IRRATIONAL DESIRES

I believe that the attempts discussed above fail to show that logically satisfiable basic desires can be rationally impotent. Obviously, this does not entail that they cannot be. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to accept a Neo-Humean view. Such acceptence need not be based on burden of proof arguments, about which there is well-grounded skepticism. I prefer instead to base it on a burden of introduction argument; because of the initial plausibility of the Neo-Humean view, critics carry the burden of introducing theories that entail that basic desires can be non-instrumentally irrational (in the relevant sense). Once such theories are introduced, the philosophical court can rule without imposing a burden of proof. I have tried to establish that three recently introduced theories in fact give us no grounds for rejecting Neo-Humeanism. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.