INDUSTRY-WIDE DISCLOSURE DYNAMICS

[1] COLLUSION AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 383 - 394

[2] DARROUGH MN, 1993, ACCOUNT REV, V68, P534

[3] PROPRIETARY AND NONPROPRIETARY DISCLOSURES [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1986, 59 (02) : 331 - 366

[4] DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1985, 23 (01) : 123 - 145

[5] FELTHAM GA, 1992, CONTEMP ACCOUNT RES, V9, P1

[6] Fried D., 1984, Q J ECON, V99, P85

[7] THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF WARRANTIES AND PRIVATE DISCLOSURE ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1981, 24 (03) : 461 - 483

[8] DISCLOSURE WHEN THE MARKET IS UNSURE OF INFORMATION ENDOWMENT OF MANAGERS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1988, 26 (01) : 146 - 153

[9] GOOD-NEWS AND BAD NEWS - REPRESENTATION THEOREMS AND APPLICATIONS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02): : 380 - 391

[10] VERRECCHIA RE, 1983, J ACCOUNT ECON, V5, P179, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3

[1] COLLUSION AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 383 - 394

[2] DARROUGH MN, 1993, ACCOUNT REV, V68, P534

[3] PROPRIETARY AND NONPROPRIETARY DISCLOSURES [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1986, 59 (02) : 331 - 366

[4] DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1985, 23 (01) : 123 - 145

[5] FELTHAM GA, 1992, CONTEMP ACCOUNT RES, V9, P1

[6] Fried D., 1984, Q J ECON, V99, P85

[7] THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF WARRANTIES AND PRIVATE DISCLOSURE ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1981, 24 (03) : 461 - 483

[8] DISCLOSURE WHEN THE MARKET IS UNSURE OF INFORMATION ENDOWMENT OF MANAGERS [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1988, 26 (01) : 146 - 153

[9] GOOD-NEWS AND BAD NEWS - REPRESENTATION THEOREMS AND APPLICATIONS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02): : 380 - 391

[10] VERRECCHIA RE, 1983, J ACCOUNT ECON, V5, P179, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3