MARKET FOR INFORMATION - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE

被引:68
作者
SUNDER, S
机构
关键词
NOISY RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS; COSTLY INFORMATION; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS;
D O I
10.2307/2951588
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Predictions of the noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE) model are found to be relatively accurate for both asset and information markets in the laboratory. When information about an asset's uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders, prices, allocations, efficiency, and distribution of profit predictions of the full revelation REE model in the asset market dominate the predictions of the Walrasian model; demand for information shifts to the left and its price declines close to zero. When the price of information is fixed at a relatively high level, the number of informed agents and the informativeness of the asset market tends to adjust to permit the informed agents to recover their investment in information.
引用
收藏
页码:667 / 695
页数:29
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