NEW PARADOXES OF VOTING POWER ON THE EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

[1] Banzhaf JF, 1965, RUTGERS LAW REV, V19, P317

[2] POWER AND SIZE - NEW PARADOX [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1976, 7 (1-2) : 29 - 56

[3] POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND - THE CONSEQUENCES OF QUOTA CHANGES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1980, 62 (01) : 97 - 106

[4] INEVITABILITY OF THE PARADOX OF REDISTRIBUTION IN THE ALLOCATION OF VOTING WEIGHTS [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1978, 33 (02) : 49 - 67

[5] HENIG S, 1983, I POLICIES EUROPEAN

[6] RAANAN J, 1976, 311 CORN U SCH OP RE

[7] EXPECTED FREQUENCY AND MEAN SIZE OF THE PARADOX OF NEW MEMBERS [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1984, 17 (01) : 29 - 45

[8] SCHOTTER A, 1979, APPLIED GAME THEORY

[9] A METHOD FOR EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN A COMMITTEE SYSTEM [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1954, 48 (03) : 787 - 792

[10] 1978, B EUROPEAN COMMUN S2, V11

[1] Banzhaf JF, 1965, RUTGERS LAW REV, V19, P317

[2] POWER AND SIZE - NEW PARADOX [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1976, 7 (1-2) : 29 - 56

[3] POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND - THE CONSEQUENCES OF QUOTA CHANGES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 1980, 62 (01) : 97 - 106

[4] INEVITABILITY OF THE PARADOX OF REDISTRIBUTION IN THE ALLOCATION OF VOTING WEIGHTS [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1978, 33 (02) : 49 - 67

[5] HENIG S, 1983, I POLICIES EUROPEAN

[6] RAANAN J, 1976, 311 CORN U SCH OP RE

[7] EXPECTED FREQUENCY AND MEAN SIZE OF THE PARADOX OF NEW MEMBERS [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1984, 17 (01) : 29 - 45

[8] SCHOTTER A, 1979, APPLIED GAME THEORY

[9] A METHOD FOR EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN A COMMITTEE SYSTEM [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1954, 48 (03) : 787 - 792

[10] 1978, B EUROPEAN COMMUN S2, V11