Theory and Model of Agricultural Insurance Subsidy

被引:1
作者
Kailiang, Wan [1 ]
Wenjun, Long [2 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Agr Univ, Coll Econ Management, Wuhan 430070, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] Minist Agr, Res Ctr Rural Econ, Beijing 100810, Peoples R China
关键词
competitive markets; agricultural insurance; financial subsidy;
D O I
10.1080/10042857.2007.10677530
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The issue of agricultural insurance subsidy is discussed in this paper aiming to make it provided more rationally and scientifically. It is started with the connection between agricultural insurance and financial subsidy. It is really necessary and crucial to implement the tinancial insurance due to the bad operational performance, especially in the developing countries. But the subsidy should be provided more rationally because financial subsidy has lots of negative effects. A model in competitive insurance markets developed by Ahsan et al (1982) and a farmers' decision model are developed to solve the optimal subsidized rate. Finally, the equation is got to calculate it. But a quantitative subsidized rate is not made here because the calculation should be under some restricted conditions, which are always absent in the developing countries. So the government should provide some subsidy for the ex ante research and preparation to get the scientific probability and premium rate.
引用
收藏
页码:42 / 48
页数:7
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