A THEORY OF EXIT IN DUOPOLY

被引:173
作者
FUDENBERG, D [1 ]
TIROLE, J [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1912845
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:943 / 960
页数:18
相关论文
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