PERFORMANCE PAY AND TOP-MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES

被引:3496
作者
JENSEN, MC [1 ]
MURPHY, KJ [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,ROCHESTER,NY 14627
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261677
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:225 / 264
页数:40
相关论文
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