REPUTATION AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

[11] ARMS RACES AND COOPERATION [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 118 - 146

[12] A THEORY OF EXIT IN DUOPOLY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (04) : 943 - 960

[13] FUDENBERG D, 1985, 843 STANF U GRAD SCH

[14] Gilpin Robert, 1981, WAR CHANGE WORLD POL

[15] GROSSMAN SJ, 1986, J ECON THEORY, V39, P120, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90023-2

[16] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[17] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[18] Harsanyi J. C., 1973, International Journal of Game Theory, V2, P1, DOI 10.1007/BF01737554

[19] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[20] FROM BALANCE TO CONCERT - A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 58 - 79

[11] ARMS RACES AND COOPERATION [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 118 - 146

[12] A THEORY OF EXIT IN DUOPOLY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (04) : 943 - 960

[13] FUDENBERG D, 1985, 843 STANF U GRAD SCH

[14] Gilpin Robert, 1981, WAR CHANGE WORLD POL

[15] GROSSMAN SJ, 1986, J ECON THEORY, V39, P120, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90023-2

[16] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[17] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[18] Harsanyi J. C., 1973, International Journal of Game Theory, V2, P1, DOI 10.1007/BF01737554

[19] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[20] FROM BALANCE TO CONCERT - A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION [J]. WORLD POLITICS, 1985, 38 (01) : 58 - 79