REPUTATION AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

被引：76

作者：

ALT, JE

CALVERT, RL

HUMES, BD

机构：

[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,POLIT SCI,ROCHESTER,NY 14627

[2] MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,POLIT SCI,E LANSING,MI 48824

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1957395

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：445 / 466

页数：22

共 46 条

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