Evaluating Institutional Performance: Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica

被引:3
作者
Bollman, Melissa [2 ]
Hardy, Scott D. [1 ]
机构
[1] McDaniel Coll, Dept Environm Studies, Westminster, MD 21157 USA
[2] Alliance Green Heat, Alliance, OH 20912 USA
关键词
payments for environmental services; transaction costs; institutions;
D O I
10.1111/j.2041-7373.2012.00070.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Payments for environmental services (PES) programs represent an innovative and increasingly popular approach to natural resource policy in Latin America. This article examines Costa Rica's PES program using evaluative criteria established using the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. First, three types of transaction costs (information, coordination, and strategic) involved with implementing the program are investigated, then the institutional performance of the PES program is assessed according to six benchmarks established using the IAD framework: economic efficiency, fiscal equivalence, redistributional equity, accountability, conformance to the values of local actors, and sustainability. Finally, recommendations for improving the program's overall performance and minimizing its transaction costs are offered.
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 207
页数:13
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