THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES - IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA EARLIER TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

China's approach toward the territorial disputes in the South China Sea exhibits a pattern similar to the one adopted in earlier territorial disputes settled in the 1960s and China's behavior in its unsettled dispute with Japan over the Diaovu/Senkaku Islands. In these previous disputes, even though China asserted large ''historical'' claims, eventually Beijing concluded settlements based on realistic historical, geographic and security considerations. One conclusion that is drawn is that although Beijing may initially assert irredentist claims, it is more interested in stable and legitimate boundaries than maintaining these historical claims. Adopting a comparative cases approach, this article concludes that if China follows the pattern that was established in earlier disputes in settling the South China Sea disputes, eventually Beijing will seek compromise settlements in order to realize more important national security interests. Using the Sino-Japanese case as a model, it is concluded that compromise settlements in the South China Sea based on principles of equity and modern international legal principles are likely, and China will not insist on recognition of its ''historical'' claim to all the islands of the South China Sea.