REGULATING LOBBYISTS AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE

被引：82

作者：

AINSWORTH, S

机构：

[1] University of Georgia, Athens

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICS | 1993年 / 55卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2132227

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

In this paper, I analyze how legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit undue interest group influence. A simple game theoretic model is developed to show that legislators have various means by which to control lobbying activity, even in the absence of stringent lobbying regulations. The costliness of the lobbyist's signals limit the lobbyist's ability to exaggerate claims.

引用

页码：41 / 56

页数：16

共 41 条

[1]

AUSTENSMITH D, 1989, COMPETITIVE LOBBYING

[2]

BAKER R, 1989, HOUSE SENATE

[3]

Bauer RA, 1968, AM BUSINESS PUBLIC P

[4] SURVEY-RESEARCH AND MEMBERSHIP IN VOLUNTARY-ASSOCIATIONS [J].