OPTIMAL MONITORING POLICIES IN AGENCIES

被引：61
作者：
DYE, RA
机构：
来源：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1986年 / 17卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2555715
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：339 / 350
页数：12
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