MARKET FORECLOSURE WITHOUT VERTICAL INTEGRATION

被引：1

作者：

HARDT, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] LONDON SCH ECON,DEPT ECON,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 47卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

VERTICAL INTEGRATION; COMMITMENT; SUPERGAME; SWITCHING COSTS; REPUTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)00552-D

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper challenges the assumption that vertical integration is the sole way for upstream and downstream firms to monopolize the downstream market. Future trade, switching costs, and reputation may constitute alternatives for vertical integration and lead to dominant outcomes.

引用

页码：423 / 429

页数：7

共 7 条

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GROSSMAN, SJ
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[3] HARDT M, 1994, MARKET FORECLOSURE V
[4] HART O, 1990, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P205
[5] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
KREPS, DM
MILGROM, P
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WILSON, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252
[6] OPTIMAL CARTEL TRIGGER PRICE STRATEGIES
PORTER, RH
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (02) : 313 - 338
[7] Tirole J., 1988, THEORY IND ORG

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