INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND DISCLOSURE IN A DUOPOLISTIC ENVIRONMENT

被引：68
作者：
FRIED, D
机构：
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1984年 / 99卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1885531
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
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页码：367 / 381
页数：15
相关论文
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