ABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, FIRM SIZE, AND DIVERSIFICATION

被引：62

作者：

ARON, DJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,CHICAGO,IL 60611

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 19卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555398

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：72 / 87

页数：16

共 18 条

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