THE DESIRABILITY OF A PERMANENT TAX AMNESTY

被引:54
作者
ANDREONI, J
机构
[1] University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(91)90037-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are two main concerns about tax amnesty. First, if it is anticipated it may increase cheating and reduce the efficiency of the tax system. Second, amnesty may be inequitable by letting cheaters 'off the hook'. However, several federal governments currently hold a policy of long-term, or permanent, tax amnesty, in apparent defiance of these concerns. This paper examines fully anticipated tax amnesty and finds that it is possible for a permanent tax amnesty to actually increase, rather than decrease, the efficiency and equity of the tax system. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:143 / 159
页数:17
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