RATIONAL DETERRENCE IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD

被引：53

作者：

NALEBUFF, B

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2010397

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：313 / 335

页数：23

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