State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

被引:100
作者
Yu, Mei [1 ]
机构
[1] Birmingham City Univ, Birmingham, W Midlands, England
关键词
State ownership; Firm performance; Split Share Structure Reform; China;
D O I
10.1016/j.cjar.2013.03.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
While the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been widely researched, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. This study applies panel data regression techniques to 10,639 firm-year observations of non-financial Chinese listed firms during 2003-2010 to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. The Split Share Structure Reform in 2005-2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability ratios. Although state ownership decreased significantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector. The findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure due to the benefits of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure Reform made previously non-tradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing the negative effect of non-tradable state shares. (C) 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 87
页数:13
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