VAGUENESS, INTERPRETATION, AND THE LAW

被引：10

作者：

Jonsson, Olafur Pall ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland

来源：

LEGAL THEORY | 2009年 / 15卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S1352325209990012

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

It is widely accepted that vagueness in law calls for a specific interpretation of the law-interpretation that changes the meaning of the law and makes it more precise. According to this view, vagueness causes gaps in the law, and the role of legal interpretation in the case of vagueness is to fill such gaps. I argue that this view is mistaken and defend the thesis that vagueness in law calls only for an application of the law to the case at hand, leaving the meaning of the law intact.

引用

页码：193 / 214

页数：22

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