EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES FOR A FINITE POPULATION AND A VARIABLE CONTEST SIZE

被引：192

作者：

SCHAFFER, ME

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-5193(88)80085-7

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：469 / 478

页数：10

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