MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

被引：35

作者：

Wiese, Harald ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Leipzig, Postfach 920, D-04009 Leipzig, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW | 2007年 / 9卷 / 02期

关键词：

Power; government coalition; outside option; Aumann-Dreze value; Shapley value; null-player axiom;

D O I：

10.1142/S0219198907001412

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Dreze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

引用

页码：307 / 322

页数：16

共 17 条

[1] Aumann R., 1988, THE SHAPLEY VALUE, P175
[2] Aumann R. J., 1974, International Journal of Game Theory, V3, P217, DOI 10.1007/BF01766876
[3] Aumann Robert, 1989, LECT GAME THEORY
[4] Brams S. J., 2002, 2002 ANN M AM POL SC
[5] Cabinet formation in coalition systems
Carmignani, F
[J]. SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2001, 48 (03) : 313 - 329
[6] ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS
HART, S
KURZ, M
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (04) : 1047 - 1064
[7] Laver M., 1985, BRIT J POLIT SCI, V15, P143
[8] Laver M., 1990, MULTIPARTY GOVT POLI, V15
[9] LUCE RD, 1956, BEHAV SCI, V1, P83
[10] MASCHLER M, 1992, HDB GAME THEORY, V1, P591, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80021-9

← 1 2 →