Does France's Two-Ballot Presidential Election System Alter Candidates' Policy Strategies? A Spatial Analysis of Office-Seeking Candidates in the 1988 Presidential Election

被引：0

作者：

Adams, James ^{[1
]}

Merrill, Samuel, III ^{[2
]}

Grofman, Bernard ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Polit Sci, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

[2] Wilkes Univ, Dept Math & Comp Sci, Wilkes Barre, PA 18766 USA

[3] Univ Calif Irvine, Sch Social Sci, Irvine, CA 92697 USA

来源：

FRENCH POLITICS | 2005年 / 3卷 / 02期

关键词：

spatial modeling; Nash equilibrium; presidential elections; behavioral research; French politics;

D O I：

10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200074

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

With rare exceptions, spatial models of candidate strategies under plurality rule have analyzed single-stage plurality elections. In this paper, we explore whether the two-stage French presidential election system plausibly changes the major candidates' policy incentives, compared to what their incentives would be in a single-stage plurality contest. We report the results of counterfactual simulations on survey data from the 1988 presidential election, which suggest that the office-seeking candidates' strategies would be similar under two-stage and single-stage plurality rules.

引用

页码：98 / 123

页数：26