INDEPENDENT NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR APPROVAL VOTING

被引：19

作者：

BAIGENT, N ^{[1
]}

XU, YS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TULANE UNIV,MURPHY INST POLIT ECON,NEW ORLEANS,LA 70118

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1991年 / 21卷 / 01期

关键词：

CHOICE FUNCTIONS; APPROVAL VOTING; PLURALITY VOTING;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(91)90037-R

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The following axioms are imposed on aggregations of choice functions: Unrestricted Domain (U), Neutrality (N), Independence of Symmetric Substitutions (ISS), Anonymity (A) and Positive Response (PR). Approval Voting is characterized by (U), (N), (ISS) and (PR); these axioms are independent. In the presence of (U), (N) and (PR), (ISS) is strictly stronger than (A). Plurality Voting is characterized by strengthening (U) along with (N), (ISS) and (PR).

引用

页码：21 / 29

页数：9

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