The Effect of Analyst Coverage on the Informativeness of Income Smoothing

被引：14

作者：

Sun, Jerry ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Windsor, Odette Sch Business, Windsor, ON, Canada

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING | 2011年 / 46卷 / 03期

关键词：

Analyst coverage; Income smoothing; Informativeness; Opportunism;

D O I：

10.1016/j.intacc.2011.07.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines whether analyst coverage affects the informativeness of income smoothing. I find that income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. The results suggest that income smoothing more efficiently communicates private information to investors when firms are followed by more analysts, consistent with the notion that analysts play an important information intermediary role in enhancing the informativeness of income smoothing. (C) 2011 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：333 / 349

页数：17

共 34 条

[1] Evidence that analyst following and institutional ownership accelerate the pricing of future earnings [J].

Ayers, BC ;

Freeman, RN .

REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2003, 8 (01) :47-67

[2] Analyst coverage and intangible assets [J].

Barth, ME ;

Kasznik, R ;

McNichols, MF .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2001, 39 (01) :1-34

[3] Who herds? [J].

Bernhardt, Dan ;

Campello, Murillo ;

Kutsoati, Edward .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 80 (03) :657-675

[4] On the relationship between analyst reports and corporate disclosures: Exploring the roles of information discovery and interpretation [J].

Chen, Xia ;

Cheng, Qiang ;

Lo, Kin .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2010, 49 (03) :206-226

[5] Dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts: Theory and evidence [J].

Clarke, J ;

Subramanian, A .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 80 (01) :81-113

[6] LACK OF TIMELINESS AND NOISE AS EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LOW CONTEMPORANEOUS RETURN EARNINGS ASSOCIATION [J].

COLLINS, DW ;

KOTHARI, SP ;

SHANKEN, J ;

SLOAN, RG .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1994, 18 (03) :289-324

[7] MANAGERIAL COMPETITION, INFORMATION COSTS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - THE USE OF ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE-MEASURES IN PROXY CONTESTS [J].

DEANGELO, LE .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1988, 10 (01) :3-36

[8] EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND THE HORIZON PROBLEM - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].

DECHOW, PM ;

SLOAN, RG .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1991, 14 (01) :51-89

[9] Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? [J].

Dyck, Alexander ;

Morse, Adair ;

Zingales, Luigi .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2010, 65 (06) :2213-2253

[10] Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders [J].

Frankel, R ;

Li, X .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2004, 37 (02) :229-259

← 1 2 3 4 →