Robust Models of CEO Turnover: New Evidence on Relative Performance Evaluation

被引:25
作者
Fee, C. Edward [1 ]
Hadlock, Charles J. [2 ]
Huang, Jing [3 ]
Pierce, Joshua R. [4 ]
机构
[1] Tulane Univ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[2] Michigan State Univ, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
[3] EY, London, England
[4] Univ Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rcfs/cfx018
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the robustness of empirical models and findings concerning CEO turnover. We show that the sensitivity of turnover to abnormal firm performance is an extremely robust result. In contrast, evidence indicating a relation between turnover and industry performance is both weak and fragile. We show that small changes in turnover modeling choices can affect inferences in a large way. Our evidence casts substantial doubt on the hypothesis that there is a large industry performance component to turnover decisions. We use our findings to offer some general prescriptions for checking robustness results in CEO turnover research.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 100
页数:31
相关论文
共 34 条
[1]   Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered [J].
Aggarwal, RK ;
Samwick, AA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (01) :71-118
[2]   The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].
Aggarwal, RK ;
Samwick, AA .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1999, 107 (01) :65-105
[3]   Performance incentives within firms: The effect of managerial responsibility [J].
Aggarwal, RK ;
Samwick, AA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (04) :1613-1649
[4]   Peer firms in relative performance evaluation [J].
Albuquerque, Ana .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2009, 48 (01) :69-89
[5]  
Angrist JD, 2009, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICISTS COMPANION, P1
[6]   PAY, PERFORMANCE, AND TURNOVER OF BANK CEOS [J].
BARRO, JR ;
BARRO, RJ .
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1990, 8 (04) :448-481
[7]   Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable [J].
Beck, N ;
Katz, JN ;
Tucker, R .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1998, 42 (04) :1260-1288
[8]   Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Mullainathan, S .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 116 (03) :901-932
[9]   Risk and CEO turnover [J].
Bushman, Robert ;
Dai, Zhonglan ;
Wang, Xue .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 96 (03) :381-398
[10]   Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter? [J].
Cornelli, Francesca ;
Kominek, Zbigniew ;
Ljungqvist, Alexander .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2013, 68 (02) :431-481