Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind

被引:26
作者
Piccinini, Gualtiero [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Dept Philosophy, St Louis, MO 63121 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.
引用
收藏
页码:515 / 532
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
[31]   Husserl and the Philosophy of the Mind [J].
Zahavi, Dan .
HUSSERL STUDIES, 2012, 28 (01) :81-84
[32]   CAUSATION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND [J].
JACKSON, F ;
PETTIT, P .
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 1990, 50 :195-214
[33]   MIND, ART, AND PHILOSOPHY [J].
BEST, D .
JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION, 1986, 20 (03) :5-17
[34]   Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind [J].
Horst, Steven .
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS, 2009, 4 (01) :219-254
[35]   PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (AND MIND) [J].
Engel, Pascal .
QUINZAINE LITTERAIRE, 2009, (986) :17-18
[36]   SANTAYANAS PHILOSOPHY OF MIND [J].
LACHS, J .
MONIST, 1964, 48 (03) :419-440
[37]   Phenomenology and the philosophy of mind [J].
Bruno, Michael .
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2006, 84 (04) :640-642
[38]   WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND [J].
Ground, Ian .
TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 2013, (5749) :22-22
[39]   An introduction to the philosophy of mind [J].
Heider, D .
FILOSOFICKY CASOPIS, 2003, 51 (06) :1035-1044
[40]   Empiricism and the philosophy of mind [J].
Bertram, JW ;
Liptow, J .
PHILOSOPHISCHE RUNDSCHAU, 2001, 48 (04) :273-300