OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT

被引：269

作者：

CREMER, J ^{[1
]}

MCLEAN, RP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911240

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：345 / 361

页数：17

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