OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT

被引：269
作者：
CREMER, J [1 ]
MCLEAN, RP [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1985年 / 53卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1911240
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：345 / 361
页数：17
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]   BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE BELIEFS [J].
DASPREMONT, C ;
GERARDVARET, LA .
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) :83-103
[2]   AUCTIONS AND BIDDING MODELS - A SURVEY [J].
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1980, 26 (02) :119-142
[3]   RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
HARRIS, M ;
TOWNSEND, RM .
ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) :33-64
[4]   ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS [J].
HARRIS, M ;
RAVIV, A .
ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) :1477-1499
[5]  
HARRIS M, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P347
[6]   GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].
HARSANYI, JC .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) :320-334
[7]  
Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[8]  
Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[9]  
HOLMSTROM B, 1981, 495 NW U JL KELL GRA
[10]   COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES [J].
HOLT, CA .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) :433-445
123