State-Owned Capital Participation in Private Enterprises: A Perspective of Debt Financing

被引:0
作者
He Dexu [1 ,2 ]
Zeng Min [2 ]
Zhang Shuonan [3 ]
机构
[1] Business School, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
[2] National Academy of Economic Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
[3] School of Finance, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
关键词
D O I
10.19602/j.chinaeconomist.2024.01.02
中图分类号
F275 [企业财务管理]; F276.5 [私营企业];
学科分类号
1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of “unarticulated rules” and “articulated rules”. The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing. This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that stateowned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels: Enhancing their social reputation, mitigating the “statistical bias” they face, optimizing their information quality, and reducing the “shareholder-creditor” agency problems. This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the “complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”. This not only constructs a theoretical framework for “reverse mixed-ownership reform” but also better narrates the Chinese story of “mixed-ownership reform” by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure. Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the microlevel.
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页码:14 / 42
页数:29
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