An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

被引：0

作者：

Christian A. Vossler

Timothy D. Mount

Robert J. Thomas

Ray D. Zimmerman

机构：

[1] 527C Stokely Management Center,Department of Economics and Institute for a Secure and Sustainable Environment

[2] University of Tennessee,Department of Applied Economics and Management

[3] Cornell University,School of Electrical and Computer Engineering

[4] Cornell University,undefined

来源：

Journal of Regulatory Economics | 2009年 / 36卷

关键词：

Soft cap auction; Uniform price auction; Electricity markets; Experimental auctions; L94; D44; C92;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.

引用

页码：44 / 59

页数：15

共 45 条

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