Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability

被引:2
作者
Cunha M. [1 ]
Sarmento P. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] FEP-UP, School of Economics and Management, University of Porto, 4200-464 Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
[2] FEP-UP and CEF-UP, University of Porto, Porto
关键词
Cartel stability; Collusion; Vertical integration;
D O I
10.1007/s10842-012-0150-9
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on the static and dynamic stability of downstream incomplete collusion. It is shown that a vertical merger between an upstream firm and a downstream cartel or fringe firm promotes downstream collusion, under certain conditions on the market size. However, for low downstream market concentration, a vertical merger with a cartel firm hinders collusion. Moreover, a welfare analysis shows that consumer surplus increases with the vertical merger because the merger partially eliminates the double marginalization problem. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 38
页数:37
相关论文
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