Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion

被引：0
作者：
Nitsan Perach
Uriel G. Rothblum
机构：
[1] Technion,Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2010年 / 39卷
关键词：
Stable matching; Incentive compatibility; Dormitory assignment;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A case study of matching students with dormitory-groups at the Technion lead recently to the study of a variant of the stable matching model with a “qualifying criterion” for the inclusion of a student among those getting an assignment. A notion of stability was introduced for the model and a (student-courting) algorithm which finds a matching that satisfied this criterion and has desired properties was described. Here, we show that students cannot benefit from misrepresenting preferences in an extension of the model that allows dormitory-groups to have different preferences over students and allows these preferences to be incomplete.
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页码：657 / 667
页数：10
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