Auditor response to changing risk: money market funds during the financial crisis

被引：0
作者：
Kyle D. Allen
Drew B. Winters
机构：
[1] Boise State University,
[2] Texas Tech University,undefined
来源：
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | 2021年 / 56卷
关键词：
Audit risk; Financial crisis; Money market funds; M42; G01; G24; G29;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Audits provide monitoring for investors. The collapse of markets across the financial crisis made assets more difficult to value, which increased risk for auditors. The money markets were at the center of the financial crisis increasing audit engagement risk on money market funds, which at the time of the crisis were highly opaque. Measuring the response to increased engagement risk with audit fees, this study finds that auditors increase their fees for the riskiest class of funds. However, no evidence was found that audit fees increased as funds increased their holdings in the riskiest class of securities.
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页码：1057 / 1086
页数：29
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