The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism

被引：0

作者：

Nikolaj Nottelmann

机构：

[1] University of Copenhagen,Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, Division of Philosophy

来源：

Philosophical Studies | 2006年 / 131卷

关键词：

Voluntary Action; Voluntary Control; Analogy Argument; Pragmatic Reason; Epistemic Reason;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of this type and argue that they all fail.

引用

页码：559 / 582

页数：23

共 8 条

[1] Gale R. M.(1999)‘William James and the Willfulness of Belief’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 71-91
[2] Govier T.(1976)‘Belief, Values, and the Will’ Dialogue 15 642-663
[3] Heil J.(1983)‘Doxastic Agency’ Philosophical Studies 43 355-364
[4] Ryan S.(2003)‘Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief’ Philosophical Studies 114 47-79
[5] Scott-Kakures D.(1993)‘On Belief and the Captivity of the Will’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 77-103
[6] Steup M.(1988)‘The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification’ Philosophical Studies 53 65-84
[7] Steup M.(2000)‘Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology’ Acta Analytica 15 25-56
[8] Stocker M.(1982)‘Responsibility Especially for Beliefs’ Mind 151 398-417

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