Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist

被引：15

作者：

Savani R. ^{[1
]}

von Stengel B. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool

[2] Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, London

来源：

Computational Management Science | 2015年 / 12卷 / 1期

基金：

英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;

关键词：

Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Scientific software;

D O I：

10.1007/s10287-014-0206-x

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper presents the “Game Theory Explorer” software tool to create and analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strategic form is created and nicely displayed with a graphical user interface in a web browser. State-of-the-art algorithms then compute all Nash equilibria of the game after a mouseclick. In tutorial fashion, we present how the program is used, and the ideas behind its main algorithms. We report on experiences with the architecture of the software and its development as an open-source project. © 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

引用

页码：5 / 33

页数：28

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