A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market

被引：0

作者：

Mattias K. Polborn

机构：

[1] Seminar für Versicherungswissenschaft,

[2] University of Munich,undefined

来源：

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory | 1998年 / 23卷

关键词：

insurance; oligopoly; imperfect competition;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium.

引用

页码：41 / 48

页数：7